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ABSTRACT
Interactions between bids to show ads online can lead to an adver-
tiser’s ad being shown to more men than women even when the
advertiser does not target towards men. We design bidding strate-
gies that advertisers can use to avoid such emergent discrimination
without having to modify the auction mechanism. We mathemati-
cally analyze the strategies to determine the additional cost to the
advertiser for avoiding discrimination, proving our strategies to be
optimal in some settings. We use simulations to understand other
settings.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Prior work found Google showing an ad for the Barrett Group, a
career coaching service promoting the seeking of high paying jobs,
more often to simulated men than women [5]. Later work enumerates
possible causes of this disparity [6].
One possibility, raised by Google itself [17], is that the Barrett
Group targeted both men and women equally, but other advertisers,
on average, focused more on women, which would be in line with
subsequent findings [13]. In this possibility, the Barrett Group found
itself outbid for just women by the other advertisers who were
willing to pay more than it was for reaching women but not for
men. These other advertisers might be promoting products that many
find acceptable to target toward women, such as makeup. Thus,
it’s possible that each advertiser’s targeting appears reasonable in
isolation but interacts to bring about emergent discrimination for a
job-related ad.
For conscientious advertisers of products that should be broad-
casted to women and men at equal rates, such an outcome is unac-
ceptable but currently difficult to avoid. While Google offers the
ability to skew ads toward men or toward women, it provides no
way to ensure that both men and women see the ad an equal number
of times. As discussed above, simply not targeting by gender is not
enough to guarantee parity. Even running two ad campaigns of equal
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size is insufficient since the size is determined by budget and not
the number of ads shown, which means that parity would only be
achieved if women and men are equally expensive to reach.
In this work, we consider how advertisers can ensure approximate
demographic parity for its ads without changing Google’s ad auction
mechanism, which is based on a second-price auction [9]. Given that
an advertiser wishes to maximize its utility by reaching the people
most likely to respond to its ads, we model the advertiser’s utility
function along with the parity goal as a constrained bidding problem.
We consider both a very strict absolute parity constraint and a more
relaxed relative constraint inspired by the US EEOC’s four-fifths
rule on disparate impact [8]. While using a second-price auction
suggests that the advertisers should bid their true value of showing
an ad, a parity constraint and multiple rounds of the auction interact
to make deviations from this truthful strategy optimal. Intuitively, as
in multi-round second-price auctions with budget constraints [10], it
is sometimes better to bid less to preserve the ability to participate
in later auctions with a lower cost of winning. More interestingly,
unlike with just budget constraints, it is also sometimes better to bid
more to ensure an acceptable degree of parity, enabling participation
in other auctions later.
Given these complexities, finding an optimal bidding strategy
for such a constrained bidding problem is non-trivial. We do so by
modeling them as a Markov Decision Problems (MDPs). Solving
these MDPs using traditional methods, such as value iteration, is
made difficult by the continuous space of possible bid values over
which to optimize. To avoid this issue, we find recursive formulae
for each type of constraint providing the optimal bid value and solve
for their values instead. This approach allows us to solve the MDPs
without needing to explicitly maximize over the possible actions as
in value iteration.
We compare this optimal constrained bidding strategy to the
optimal unconstrained strategy for both real and simulated data sets.
The cost to the advertiser for ensuring parity varies by setting, but is
manageable under the more realistic settings explored. In all cases,
the revenue of the simulated Google remains roughly the same or
goes up.
By not modifying the core auction algorithm used by Google and
instead suggesting bidding strategies that could be deployed by the
advertisers, we believe this work provides a practical path towards
nondiscriminatory advertising.
2 RELATEDWORK
The most closely related work, recently looked at enforcing parity
constraints with auction mechanisms, whereas we do so with bidding
strategies [4]. While both approaches have their use cases, we believe
ours is easier to deploy since just the advertisers wanting the feature
need to make changes to implement it. We further discuss tradeoffs
ar
X
iv
:1
90
9.
02
15
6v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  5
 Se
p 2
01
9
Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA Milad Nasr and Michael Carl Tschantz
between deployment approaches in Section 8. Our approach also
differs by using strict constraints whereas theirs uses probabilistic
constraints. Probabilistic constraints allow more utility but may be
insufficient in cases where approximate parity is required, as when
disparate impact is prohibited. At an algorithmic level, they differ
by using gradient decent.
A similar alternative approach could use auction mechanisms
with Guaranteed ad Delivery (GD) [15, 18]. An advertiser can act
as two parties to the auction, one for each gender, and use GD to
ensure an equal number of wins for each party. Unlike our bidding
strategy, which an advertiser can unilaterally employ, this approach
requires the ad exchange to change its auction mechanisms.
Prior works have looked at how to enforce (proportional) parity
constraints on the classifications produced by ML algorithms [2, 3,
12, 20]. We instead look at auctions.
Prior works have used MDPs to model ad slot auctions. Li et al. [14]
and Iyer et al. [11] have used them to find optimal bidding strategies
when advertisers do not know the exact values of each type of ad slot
and learn values by winning them. They showed advertisers should
overbid to learn more information. Gummadi et al. [10] described
the optimal bidding strategy for the second-price auction in which
each advertiser has a limited budget, which leads to underbidding.
Zhang et al. [21] derived optimal real-time bidding strategies when
each ad slot have different properties.
3 ONLINE AD AUCTIONS
When a person visits a webpage, the webpage will often contain
dynamically loaded ads at fixed locations on the page. These ads
each occupy an ad slot, a location at a time (or page load) on the
webpage. In some cases, the website selects which ads to show
in which slots itself, such as with Facebook. In other cases, the
website contracts with a third-party, to fill and charge for the slots
in exchange for payments to the website. In either case, We call the
entity choosing how to fill the slots an ad exchange. For example,
Google runs an ad exchange, Google Ad Manager, which includes
slots put up for sale by websites with its AdSense tool.
Typically, an ad exchange auctions off the slots it controls to
advertisers. It can use real-time bidding to auction off the slots
as the webpage loads. The website and the ad exchange can offer
advertisers various amounts of information about the slot, such
as the webpage it is on and demographics about who is loading
the page. Advertisers performing programmatic advertising use a
dynamic bidding strategy that adjusts their bids according to how
well they expect their ads to perform in the offered slot. To avoid
having to create programs for executing such strategies on their
own, advertisers often use a demand-side platform (DSP). Figure 1
demonstrates a sketch of the interactions.
An ad exchange may accept bids that are more complex than
just a single price, such as including an offer to pay a bonus if the
website visitor clicks the ad [9]. Exchanges wishing to maximize the
amount of bonuses it receives, or to avoid annoying visitors, might
consider the quality of the ad and it’s fit for the slot. For simplicity,
we will not consider these complications and instead presume that
all bids are simply offers to pay for showing the ad.
Second price auctions is a common mechanism for resolving
such auctions, with Google using a variation of one [9], and we will
Ad Exchange
Person
1.Request
 a page 2.Request an ad
5.Return an ad
3. Get advertisers
 bids
4. Find the best
 advertiser
DSP
Advertisers
6.Receive 
page with ad
DSP
Figure 1: Online advertisement interactions
presume the ad exchange uses one. In this auction mechanism, the
exchange selects the highest bidder as the winner but only charges
the bidder the price offered by the second highest bidder. Under
certain circumstances, this mechanism ensures that each bidder’s
optimal strategy is to bid the actual amount it values the slot at,
making the mechanism truthful. Since ad exchanges sometimes sell
more than one slot at time, such as for a webpage with multiple slots,
they often use generalized second-price auctions, known as position
auctions [7, 19].
We model the above economy as a sequential game of incomplete
information, where in each round of the game a set of self-interested
rational advertisers bids to win an ad slot through a second-price
auction. We allow bids to vary over auctions and assume that each
advertiser has a geometric lifespan. For simplicity, we make the total
number of advertisers α equal in all auctions by assuming that every
time an advertiser dies a new advertiser joins.
At time t , each advertiser i submits a bid bti . Let b
t
−i be the bids
of other the advertisers. The ad exchange platform runs a second-
price auction where Advertiser i wins the ad slot if its bid is higher
than all other bids: bti > maxb
t
−i . For simplicity, we assume no ties,
ensuring that such a winner exists. Let ati be 1 if the advertiser i
wins at round t and be 0 otherwise. If the advertiser i wins it will
pay the second highest bid dti = maxb
t
−i . The cost of the auction t
is cti = a
t
i ∗ dti since the advertiser i only pays if it wins.
The ad slot auctioned at t has a valuevti for the advertiser i. When
an advertiser i wins auction t , it gets an immediate reward, which is
the value vti less its price d
t
i . Thus, the utility of advertiser i gained
at each round is uti = a
t
i ∗vti − cti = ati (vti − dti ). Let the geometric
parameter for the lifespan distribution for advertiser i be δi . The
total utility for each advertiser is Ui =
∑∞
t=0 δ
t
i ∗ ati (vti − dti ) where
δ ti is exponentiation, not indexing like the others.
The advertiser i should select its bids bti to maximize the expected
value of Ui where the expectation is over its value vti and the bids
of other advertisers bt−i . The advertiser can use market research, its
prior experiences, and any information provided by the ad exchange
to estimate these uncertain values. In the case of a pure second-price
auction, the values of the other bids bt−i are irrelevant and the optimal
strategy is to always set its bid bti equal to its estimation of its value
vti .
However, this result does not carry over to all second-price auc-
tions with constraints, including the parity constraints we consider.
In this case, the behavior the other advertisers matters, but estimating
it for individual ad slots is difficult. Furthermore, the advertiser is
unlikely to estimate the value of every ad slot individually even for
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a pure second-price auction. Rather, the advertiser will likely model
ad slots as each having a type belonging to a set Θ of reasonable
size. The types will represent the most important information to the
advertiser about the slot. For simplicity, we will typically assume
that Θ is equal to Γ.
For each type θ , the advertiser will estimate the expected valuevθi
of a slot of type θ . For estimating the other bids, prior research [11]
has shown it reasonable to model them as coming a stationary fixed
distribution due to the large number of other advertisers. To simplify
the future analysis, we denote the CDF of other bids for a slot of
type θ by дθi . Finally, let p
θ
i be the probability that the advertiser
assigns to type θ .
With these estimations, we compute estimations of other key
quantities. The probability of winning on auction t for a slot of type
θ with a bid of x is q(x ;дθi ) = Pr(bt−i ≤ x) = дθi (x)(α−1) where α is
the number of advertisers at each ad slot auction.
The expected value of the utility for the advertiser i for a single
auction given the distribution of the other advertisers’ bid дwi and
дmi is E[uti ] =
∑
θ p
θ
i × q(vti ;дθi ) × (vti − dti ). The expect value of
the total utility for each advertiser is
E[Ui ] =
∑
t
δ t−1i
∑
θ
pθi q(vti ;дθi )(vti − dti ) (1)
4 PARITY CONSTRAINTS
Advertisers may have concerns in addition to attempting to maximize
the utilityUi , such as complying with laws and social norms. In some
cases, this will include ensuring that its ads reach various protected
groups to the same degree. For example, an employer may desire
that a job ad be shown to an equal number of women and men to
comply with laws prohibiting gender discrimination in hiring [6].
Such advertisers would like to place their bids in a manner to ensure
such demographic parity.
However, the above auction mechanism, as well Google’s actual
mechanism as far as we can tell, does not offer any way of ensuring
that a job ad is shown to an approximately equal number of women
and men, as required by laws prohibiting gender discrimination in
hiring [6]. Furthermore, ad exchanges may be unwilling to support
such constraints given that only some advertisers have such concerns.
Thus, our goal is to provide advertisers with a bidding strategy that
dynamically adjusts bids to preserve the gender parity of the viewers,
which advertisers can unilaterally use without needing changes to
the auction mechanism of the ad exchange.
As an additional benefit of not modifying the ad auction mech-
anism, our bidding strategy can be used for any type of auction.
However, we design and analyze them with only with second-price
auctions in mind.
To state our goal more precisely, we have to distinguish between
absolute (additive) and ratio (relative) parity. An advertiser has K-
strict absolute parity, or K-parity for short, if after each auction, the
maximum difference between the number of auctions that it wins
for each gender is not more than K . An advertiser has R-ratio parity,
after each auction, if the maximum ratio of the number of auctions
that it wins for each gender is not more than R.
Our goal is to find the optimal bidding strategy for advertisers
obeying either type of constraint. This task is difficult since a con-
strained advertiser must consider not just the immediate reward of
winning a slot, but also how it may close or open the possibility of
winning additional slots later. To see this, we will consider three
examples involving a simplified setting in which an advertiser i is
subject to 1-parity and knows exactly how long it will live. In each
example, it values men and women both at 20 (no variance), but that
other advertisers value women at an expected value of 21 and men
at an expected value of 5. This setting reflects that advertisers are
willing to pay more, on average, for women than men [13].
In the first example we consider, the advertiser knows that it will
live for exactly one ad auction. In this case, the advertiser i will bid
the value of the immediate reward 20 that it receives for winning an
auction regardless of whether it is subject to a 1-parity constraint
since winning the auction has no effect other than that immediate
reward. It will win an auction for a man and lose an auction for a
woman.
Next, consider the advertiser’s behavior for a series of two auc-
tions. The interesting case is two men in a row. In this case, advertiser
i can only win one of the slots since it is subject to a 1-parity policy.
Thus, the utility of the advertiser will be smaller from having 1-parity,
but it need not be half that of when it is unrestricted. If the number of
women is small enough (p ≪ 0.5), the advertiser can assume it will
get two men in a row and can lower the value of its bid on the first
man in hopes of winning at a discount, given the fluctuations in the
other advertisers’ bids. We call this underbidding, although we em-
phasize that it is underbidding with respect to its immediate reward,
not with respect to what is overall rational. Underbidding effectively
allows the advertiser i to skip the first auction if the variance in the
other advertisers’ bids produces an abnormally high competing bid.
This is similar to how underbidding is optimal in some repeated
second-price auctions with a constrained budget [10]. The degree
of underbidding must balance the chance at getting a male slot at
a discount with the risk of either losing both auctions or getting a
female slot for the second auction.
The opposite, overbidding, can also occur. To see this, consider
a series of three auctions with a woman followed by two men. In
this case, the advertiser i can win both men, despite the 1-parity
constraint, provided that it first wins the woman. Thus, winning the
woman produces not just an immediate reward, but also a future
reward by unlocking the ability to win more men. If we presume
negligible variance in the other bids, the advertiser i will have to bid
22 to win the woman and pay the second price of 21, yielding an
immediate reward of −1 by bidding 1 over the inherent value 20 of
the female ad slot to the advertiser. However, since the immediate
reward of a male slot is 20 − 5 = 15, being able to win the second
man means a net positive gain of 15 − 1. (We ignore the effects of
underbidding since we are now considering negligible variance in
the other advertiser’s bids, which makes the effect go away.)
We find this distinction between the immediate reward and the
future rewards coming from future flexibility useful for determining
the optimal bidding strategy. However, doing so requires not only
making the above intuitions quantitative, but also dealing with addi-
tional probabilistic factors, such as the genders of ad slots not being
known in advance and the uncertain duration of the auction sequence.
To overcome these difficulties, we switch to a more systematic model
for each type of constraint.
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5 ABSOLUTE PARITY CONSTRAINTS
An advertiser want to show an ad to equal numbers of men and
women. A particularly careful advertiser may desire that this parity
constraint holds not only at the end of ad campaign but throughout.
Such continuous parity ensures that the advertiser would pass an
audit checking for this property at any point in time. It also ensures
meeting the parity goal if the the ad campaign must be cut short or if
a sudden influx of competing advertisers prevents winning addition
slots.
Meeting this strict goal is impossible since the first ad must go to
either a man or woman, and not both. To account for this, we relax
this goal by allowing a difference to arise. We use K to denote the
maximum allowed difference where K = 1 is the strictest constant
compatible with showing any ads.
To make this precise, we let Γ denote a set of groups. We are
typically interested in the case where Γ = {m,w} with m denoting
men and w women. In this case, we use p to denote the probability
of a male ad slot (i.e., pmi ). We use ni to denote the number ad slots
for people in group i won by the constrained advertiser.
DEFINITION 1 (K -PARITY). An advertiser obeys a K-absolute
parity constraint, or K-parity for short, for a set of groups Γ iff, after
each auction, for all groups i and j in Γ, the number of auctions that
it wins satisfies ni − nj ≤ K .
We study approximating the optimal bidding stagy that an adver-
tiser desiring to meet a K-parity constraint can use to do so. In our
analysis, we assume all of the advertisers have an unlimited budget.
Thus, they can bid on all auctions in its lifespan, unless maintaining
K-parity constraint precludes it.
5.1 Modeling
To find the optimal bidding strategy for the K-parity advertiser, we
model the problem as a Markov Decision Problem (MDP). The
obvious state space for such an MDP would have states of the form
⟨nm,nw,θ⟩, where nm and nw is the current number male and female
viewers, respectively, and θ is the type of the ad slot currently being
auctioned off, which we presume corresponds to a gender. (θ could
be generalized to allow targeting toward certain men and women.)
Observing that only nm −nw matters, we instead use a smaller space
of |Θ| × (2K +1) states. We denote each state by a tuple ⟨k,θ⟩, where
k is the difference between male and female viewers. When the
advertiser wins an ad slot for a male viewer, the advertiser goes from
state k to k + 1; for a female, it goes from k to k − 1. The value of
the θ is decided by a random process depending upon the value of p,
where p is probability of the viewer being male.
To find the optimal solution, we write the Bellman equation for
the MDP in the steady state. Since we consider the steady state
regime we also replace the value of each ad slot by its expected
value (i.e., vθi ). The value function for each state except for two
states ⟨K ,m⟩ and ⟨−K ,w⟩ has two parts: a reward function R that
indicates the immediate reward of taking action bi and N that is the
future value the advertiser gets by doing that action. We write the
value functions as follows:
V (k,θ ;дi ) = max
bi
{
Rθ (bi ;дθi ) + δN θ (bi ,k ;дi )
}
(2)
Rθ (bi ;дθi ) = q(bi ;дθi )(vθi − dθi ) (3)
N θ (bi ,k ;дi ), the future value that advertiser i gets by bidding bi
at state ⟨k,θ⟩, consists of two part with the first part N θwin being the
value that the advertiser gets if it wins and the second part N θlose
being the value when it loses. We treat дi as providing both дmi and
дwi . R
w(bi ;дwi ) and Rm(bi ;дmi ) show the reward value that advertiser
i will receive if it wins an ad slot auction viewed by female and male.
We have:
N θ (bi ,k ;дi ) = q(bi ;дθi ) ∗ N θwin(k ;дi ) + (1 − q(bi ;дθi )) ∗ N θlose(k ;дi )
with
Nmwin(k ;дi ) = pV (k + 1,m;дi ) + (1 − p)V (k + 1,w;дi )
Nwwin(k ;дi ) = pV (k − 1,m;дi ) + (1 − p)V (k − 1,w;дi )
N θlose(k ;дi ) = pV (k,m;дi ) + (1 − p)V (k,w;дi )
As for the two edge cases, their values are solely determined by the
values of their successor states since the advertiser cannot win the
current auction:
V (K ,m;дi ) = δ ∗ (pV (K ,m;дi ) + (1 − p)V (K ,w;дi ))
V (−K ,w;дi ) = δ ∗ (pV (−K ,m;дi ) + (1 − p)V (−K ,w;дi ))
5.2 Computing Optimal Bidding Strategies
Computing V with MDP solvers, such as value iteration, is com-
plicated by the bid space being continuous. Computing V for a
discretization of this space will require a fine discretization to avoid
rounding errors, which will mean slow convergence. Using numer-
ical optimization methods is complicated by V not being a linear
function in bi . To avoid these complexities, we instead rewrite V in
a form that can be solved without any optimization.
To identify the optimal bidding strategy, we observe that the two
edge cases do not involve a decision and the strategy of bidding 0 is
forced for them. We also observe that for the remaining states the
valuation function (2) includes many terms that do not change under
various bidding strategies. We collect these constants into a term
Λi , which we can ignore while optimizing the strategy. We replace
q(bi ;дθi )dti by c(bi ;дθi ) that indicates the estimated cost of each ad
slot. The remainder of the valuation function provides the conjoint
valuation function Φθi . In more detail,
V (k,θ ;дi ) = max
bi
{
q(bi ;дθi )Φθi (k ;дi ) − c(bi ;дθi ) + Λi (k ;дi )
}
= max
bi
{
q(bi ;дθi )Φθi (k ;дi ) − c(bi ;дθi )
}
+ Λi (k ;дi ) (4)
where
Λi (k ;дmi ,дwi ) = δ (pV (k,m;дi ) + (1 − p)V (k,w;дi ))
The conjoint valuation Φ represents the reward for winning, both
immediate and long-term, which is why it is multiplied by the prob-
ability of winning q(bi ;дθi ). The expected cost of winning c(bi ;дθi )
is subtracted from this product. Φ breaks down along the lines of
winning and losing cases, as N did:
Φθ (k ;дi ) = vθi + δ (Φθwin(k ;дi ) − Φθlose(k ;дi )) (5)
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where
Φmwin(k ;дi ) = pV (k + 1,m;дi ) + (1 − p)V (k + 1,w;дi )
Φwwin(k ;дi ) = pV (k − 1,m;дi ) + (1 − p)V (k − 1,w;дi )
Φθlose(k ;дi ) = pV (k,m;дi ) + (1 − p)V (k,w;дi )
The term vθi represents the immediate value of winning the ad slot.
The reminder considers the gain that the advertiser gets from the
future by winning (moving to a new state) or losing (staying put).
The difference between future rewards for winning and those for
losing corresponds to the amount of overbidding called for, which
explains the subtraction in (5).
The following theorem shows the usefulness of this decomposi-
tion. It uses the following lemma:
LEMMA 1 (IYER et al. 2011). For any continues non-decreasing
function q(x) on [0, 1] × [0, 1], function f (x ,v) = q(x)(v − x) +∫ x
0 q(u) du gains its maximum when x = v.
THEOREM 1. For any given дi and K , the optimal bid at all states
⟨k,θ⟩ other than the edge cases ⟨K ,m⟩ and ⟨−K ,w⟩ is Φθi (k ;дi ).
PROOF. Without loss of generality we assume all of the bids are
between 0 and 1. The bidding strategy that maximize the equation (4)
will be the optimal strategy. To maximize this equation, we can omit
the Λi function since it is constant for each bi . Similar to [11], we
rewrite the cost function c(bi ;дθi ) as
c(bi ;дθi ) = q(bi ;дθi )bi −
∫ bi
0
q(u;дθi )du
Now, we can rewrite the decision problem of the advertiser i as
max
bi
{
q(bi ;дmi )Φmi (k ;дmi ,дwi ) − c(bi ;дmi )
}
= max
bi
{
q(bi ;дmi )Φmi (k ;дi ) −
(
q(bi ;дmi )bi −
∫ bi
0
q(u;дmi ) du
)}
= max
bi
{
q(bi ;дmi )(Φmi (k ;дi ) − bi ) +
∫ vi
0
q(u;дmi ) du
}
We know q(bi ;дmi ) is a continues non-decreasing function. There-
fore, we can use Lemma 1 with q(x) = q(x ;дmi ) to conclude equa-
tion (4) is at its maximum when the bid is Φmi (k ;дi ) for θ = m. Sim-
ilarly we can show for equation (4) that the optimal bid is Φwi (k ;дi )
where θ = w. □
This theorem means that we do not need to search the space
of possible bid values to find the optimal bid. Rather, we can just
compute the optimal bid using Φ. While Φ depends upon the value
function V , we can recursively make use of this fact to compute V
without such a search either. In particular, the theorem implies that
V (k,θ ;дi ) = Rθ (Φθi (k ;дi );дθi ) + δN θ (Φθi (k ;дi ),k ;дi )
However, this equation is still not a closed form solution. Thus,
Algorithm 1 does this calculation iteratively to converge to the states’
values. Although, showing the convergence in general is an open
problem, as discussed in Section 7, our experiments find convergence
within a reasonable tolerance within a feasible number of iterations.
To use our approach, an advertiser (or DSP) runs Algorithm 1 to
compute the value function V and stores it as a look-up table. Then,
for each new ad auction, the advertiser first checks if it winning
ALGORITHM 1: Iterative approach to find V
Input: K, дi , α, vm, vw , ϵ
Initialize V [−K : K, m] ← vm+vw2 ;V [−K : K, w] ← v
m+vw
2
repeat
∆← 0
for k in {−K, . . . , K } do
for θ in {m, w} do
V ′[k, θ ] ← Rθ (Φθ (k );дθi ) + δN θ (Φθ (k ), k ;дi )
∆← max(∆, |V ′[k, θ ] −V [k, θ ] |)
end
end
V ← V ′
until ∆ < ϵ
the auction would violate the parity constraint. If so, it will not
participate in the auction (i.e., bids zero). Otherwise, The advertiser
bids the value of Θθi (k), which can be easily computed from value
functions.
6 RATIO CONSTRAINTS
While constraints on the difference between the number of ads shown
to each gender are intuitive, the EEOC’s four-fifths rule found in US
regulations against disparate impact in employment instead focuses
on a ratio [8]. The ratio considered is not simply between the number
of ads shown to each gender. Rather, it acknowledges that parity can
be unrealistic due to having differing numbers of male and female
applicants. It adjusts for that factor by comparing the fraction of
female applicants receiving a job offer to the fraction male applicants
receiving a job offer. It requires that this ratio of ratios be between
5/4 and 4/5. Similarly, our ratio constraint compares two ratios,
checking whether the fraction of female ad slots won is within a
factor of r to the fraction of male ad slots won.
Strictly enforcing this check creates problems when the number
of slots seen so far is small since the fractions won may be very
far apart even when the number of ads shown to each gender only
differs by 1. To avoid this issue, we also allow an additive difference
in the number of ads show to each gender. The resulting rule may be
viewed as a hybrid between a pure ratio constraint and the absolute
constraint we have already presented.
We use similar notation as in Section 5.1 to express this constraint
in a manner that avoids division by zero.
DEFINITION 2 ((r ,K)-RATIO). An advertiser obeys a (r ,K)-ratio
constraint, for a set of groups Γ iff, after each auction, for all groups
i and j in Γ, the number of auctions that it wins satisfies rpinj ≤
pjni +K where pi and pj is the probability of seeing slots for groups
i and j, respectively.
6.1 Modeling
Similar to the K-parity constraint, we limit ourselves to the case
where Γ and Θ only contain two types, which we treat as male and
female. We use p as the probability of a male. We denote each state
by a triplet ⟨nm,nw,θ⟩, where nm and nw is the current number male
and female viewers, respectively.
While we reuse the immediate reward function Rθ from (3), we
rewrite the value function V and future value function N . When
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winning the slot would not violate the constraint,
V (nw,nm,θ ;дi ) = max
bi
{
Rθ (bi ;дθi ) + δN θ (bi ,nm,nw;дi )
}
When offered a male that may not be won because r (1−p)(nm+1) >
pnw + K where nm is the current number of males won,
V (nw,nm,m;дi ) = δ (pV (nm,nw,m;дi ) + (1 − p)V (nm,nw,w;дi ))
When a female may not be won since rp(nw + 1) > (1 − p)nm + K ,
V (nw,nm,w;дi ) = δ (pV (nm,nw,m;дi ) + (1 − p)V (nm,nw,w;дi ))
We call these two cases edge cases.
We set the future value N θ (bi ,nm,nw;дi ) at
q(bi ;дθi ) ∗ N θwin(nm,nw;дi ) + (1 − q(bi ;дθi )) ∗ N θlose(nm,nw;дi )
with
Nmwin(nm,nw;дi ) = pV (nm+1,nw,m;дi ) + (1−p)V (nm+1,nw,w;дi )
Nwwin(nm,nm;дi ) = pV (nm,nw+1,m;дi ) + (1−p)V (nm,nw+1,w;дi )
N θlose(nm,nw;дi ) = pV (nm,nw,m;дi ) + (1−p)V (nm,nw,w;дi )
6.2 Computing Optimal Bidding Strategies
We use a similar approach as in Section 5.2 to find optimal strategies.
As before, we force the strategy to bid zero when winning would vio-
late the constraint and do not include these cases in the optimization.
We rewrite the value V (nm,nwθ ;дi ) as
max
bi
{
q(bi ;дθi )Φθi (nm,nw;дi ) − c(bi ;дθi )
}
+ Λi (nm,nw;дi )
where
Λi (nm,nw;дmi ,дwi ) = δ (pV (nm,nw,m;дi ) + (1 − p)V (nm,nw,w;дi ))
and
Φθ (nm,nw;дi ) = vθi + δ (Φθwin(nm,nw;дi ) − Φθlose(nm,nw;дi ))
where
Φmwin(nm,nw;дi ) = pV (nm+1,nw,m, ;дi ) + (1−p)V (nm+1,nw,w;дi )
Φwwin(nm,nw;дi ) = pV (nm,nw+1,m;дi ) + (1−p)V (nm,nw+1,w;дi )
Φθlose(nm,nw;дi ) = pV (nm,nw,m;дi ) + (1−p)V (nm,nw,w;дi )
THEOREM 2. For all r , K , groups i, and states ⟨nm,nw,θ⟩ other
than the edge cases, the optimal bid is Φθi (nm,nw;дi ).
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1.
This theorem eliminates the need for searching the space of pos-
sible bids at each state to find the optimal one. Whereas we could
bound the state space for K-parity by tracking the difference k in-
stead of the actual numbers of male and female ad slots won, we
cannot similarly bound the state space for the (r ,K)-ratio constraint.
In practice, however, each advertiser either has a limited budget or is
advertising for a limited time allowing us to estimate a finite set of
reachable states. We use µ to indicate estimated the maximum num-
ber of male ad slots won in our experiments. Algorithm 2 computes
the value of each state reachable assuming µ.
An advertiser using our approach, does so in the same manner
as with our approach to parity constraints. That is, it first runs Al-
gorithm 2 and stores V as a look-up table. It skips auctions when
winning would violate the constraint and otherwise bids Θθi (k), com-
puted from V .
ALGORITHM 2: Iterative approach to find V
Input: r, K, p, дi , α, vm, vw , ϵ, µ
Initialize V [0 : M, 0 : r (1−p)p M + K, m] ← v
m+vw
2 ;
V [0 : M, 0 : r (1−p)p M + K, w] ← v
m+vw
2
repeat
∆← 0
for nm in {0, . . . , µ } do
for nw in {0, . . . , r (1−p)p µ + K } do
for θ in {m, w} do
V ′[nm, nw, θ ] ←
Rθ (Φθ (nm, nw);дθi ) + δN θ (Φθ (nm, nw), nm, nw;дi )
∆← max(∆, |V ′[nm, nw, θ ] −V [nm, nw, θ ] |)
end
end
end
V ← V ′
until ∆ < ϵ
We can extend this approach to recover if the advertiser underesti-
mates µ. In this case, the advertiser can use a linear approximation to
estimate the optimal bid. To do so, let ρ = nwnm (µ−1). If ρ is an integer
value, then the advertiser bids Φθ (ρ, µ − 1). Otherwise, the advertiser
bids Φθ (⌊ρ⌋, µ − 1) + (ρ − ⌊ρ⌋) ∗ (Φθ (⌈ρ⌉,nm) − Φθ (⌊ρ⌋,nm)).
7 EXPERIMENTS
We simulate various scenarios to show the feasibility of our method
and to measure the impact of our fairness constraints on utility. To
do so, we implemented a second-price auction simulator in Python,
where each advertiser gets the gender of the website viewer before
selecting its bid and participating in the ad slot auction. To simulate
the viewer, we draw their genders independent and identically from
a binomial distribution with probability p where p is the probability
of the viewer be male.
We focus on a single advertiser i and measure how its utility
changes when it has either one of our fairness constraints or not.
When having fairness constraints, it uses our bidding strategy, with
δ set to 0.999 (unless otherwise noted) and ϵ set to 0.001. When
not, it bids it immediate value vti for the ad slot t , as is rational
for an unrestricted second-price auction. We assume that the other
advertisers are unrestricted, that they always bid their values. To
obtain distributions over ad values, we used both a real dataset (The
Yahoo! A1 Search Marketing Advertiser Bidding Dataset) and a
simulated one. The Yahoo! A1 data does not have exact timestamp
so we could not use it to estimate the number of advertisers (i.e.,
α) for each ad auction. To estimate α , we visited top websites1 that
have ads using header bidding method [16] for one month (June
2019) and collected how many advertisers bid on a specific ad slot.
In our experiments we never saw more than 10 advertisers bid on an
ad slot suction. In line with our observation, we assume that there
are α = 10 advertisers bidding for each ad slot.
7.1 Real Dataset
The Yahoo! A1 Search Marketing Advertiser Bidding Dataset con-
tains anonymized bids of advertisers participating in Yahoo! Search
1based on https://www.alexa.com/topsites
Bidding Strategies with Gender Nondiscrimination Constraints for Online Ad Auctions Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5
Bid
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
0.125
0.150
0.175
F
ra
ct
io
n
Lognorm
First two days
Last two days
Figure 2: Distribution of the bids for two different periods. The
distributions are similar in both periods which supports the as-
sumption that bids distribution are stationary.
Marketing auctions for the top 1000 search queries from June 15,
2002, to June 14, 2003. The dataset includes 18 millions bids from
more than 10,000 advertisers, but without the exact timestamps or
information about the ad viewer. Each record in this dataset indicates
a course timestamp with 15 minutes precision, the advertiser, the
keyword, and the bid.
In our analysis, we assumed bids have stationary distribution. We
evaluate this assumption on our dataset. We use a specific keyword
(keyword number 2) and we gathered all of bids from different adver-
tisers in four days period (starting 2/15/2003). Then, we compute the
empirical distribution of the bids of the first two days and the second
two days. Figure 2 presents the distribution of the bids for these pe-
riods, showing that the distributions are very similar in both periods,
supporting our stationarity assumption. The figure also shows that
the bids follow a log-normal distribution, in line with the findings of
Balseiro et al. [1].
Each keyword in our dataset has a different bid value distribution
and the restricted adviser can model each keyword separately. We
use the similar approach in our simulations and for each simulation
we compute the optimal bidding strategy for a specific keyword. We
assume that restricted advertiser updates his model parameters every
two days.
As mentioned, the Yahoo A1 dataset does not contain the exact
timestamps. Therefore, we cannot exactly determine which advertis-
ers participated in any single ad auction. We randomly select a set
of advertisers’ bids from each 15 minutes interval for each of our ad
auctions. Since the dataset does not include information about the
viewers, we sample the bids for both female and male viewers from
the same set of bid values, making their values equal.
Figures 3(a) and 3(c) show the total utility ratio of the K-parity
and (r ,K)-ratio versions to the unrestricted version of the advertiser
i for various values of K , r , and p on Yahoo A1 bid dataset. Here,
and in the other simulations, we compute this ratio by simulating
restricted and unrestricted versions of the advertiser i, using the
same draw of values across the two versions. We do this 100 times,
Table 1: Parameters for the log-normal distribution used in the
modeling the bids in the ad slot auctions. σ 2 is always 0.7.
Name Others Advertiser i
µm−i µ
w
−i µ
m
i µ
w
i
Equal price - Female valuable -2.8 -2.8 -3.5 -2.4
Expensive female - Equal value -3.5 -2.4 -2.8 -2.8
computing the average of total utilities Ui for each version. We then
plot the ratio of these two averages. Since the value of ad slots
for both female and male viewers are equal, the total utility of an
unrestricted advertiser will not change for different values of p. On
the other hand, a restricted advertiser will get different utilities based
on the distribution of the men and women viewers. K-parity and
(r ,K)-ratio constraints are harder to achieve for extreme values of p.
Turning to the effects of K , the results show that when K is large, the
K-parity advertiser can reach the utility of the unrestricted advertiser.
Also by relaxing r , r -ratio advertiser achieves higher utility. To show
the benefit of our approach compared to simply bidding immediate
values, we compare the utility ratio both approaches. Figure 3(d)
shows that our bidding strategy allows the advertiser achieve a higher
utility.
7.2 Synthetic Data
A major limitation of the real dataset for our purposes is that it does
not show which ad slots are for men and which for women. Thus,
we use a synthetic dataset to explore how changing their relative
values affects the advertiser’s utility. We generate two synthetic
datasets using a log-normal distribution to sample the advertisers
bids. Table 1 shows the model parameter settings used for the two
scenarios.
To show the effect of assigning different values to men and
women, consider an advertiser that gives more value to female slots
than to male ones, as shown in the Equal price - Female valuable
parameter settings. Figure 4(c) shows the utility ratio for the K-parity
and unrestricted versions of the advertiser in this scenario. The K-
parity version has its maximum utility ratio when there are more
male than female slots. This may seem counter-intuitive since the
advertiser values females more, but the measured ratio reflects that
an abundance of males means that the K-parity version will not have
to operate much differently from the unrestricted one. This is due
to their abundance making overbidding less needed, decreasing the
K-parity version’s costs. Lambrecht et al. [13] empirically showed
that young women are more expensive to show ads to. To simulate
this setting, we considered a scenario in which the other advertisers
prefer females (i.e., дwj < д
m
j for all j , i). We used the Expensive
female - Equal value parameter settings for this scenario. As in the
first scenario, we have advertiser i value both types equally, at the
average of the two different values used by the other advertisers.
Figure 4(d) plots the total utility ratio as before (solid line). Note
that as women become rare, the K-parity version struggles relative
to the unrestricted one since the other advertisers snap up the few
women leaving the constrained version unable to bid for men. The
figure also shows the total utility ratio for a constrained version of
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Figure 3: Experimental results for Yahoo A1 bidding dataset
the advertiser i that uses the same simple bidding strategy as the
unrestricted advertisers (dashed line). Note that ratio is lower than
with our optimal bidding strategy, showing its value. This differ-
ence comes from our optimal bidding strategy overbidding for the
female viewers, delaying the aforementioned effect. Figure 4(e) tells
a similar story for the ratio constraint.
Figures 4(f) and 4(g) further explore overbidding using a variation
on the Expensive female - Equal value scenario. Rather than keep
the value that the advertiser i assigns to males fixed at µmi = −2.5,
we vary this value to see its effect on overbidding. Rather than
plot µmi itself, we plot the ratio of µ
m
i to the value assigned to
males by the other advertisers. Figure 4(f) shows this value ratio
by using various lines. For all such ratios above 1, as the rate p of
male viewers increases, the optimal K-parity advertiser will increase
its overbidding on the female viewers since they are more scared.
Figure 4(g) shows that as µmi (and, thus, the male value ratio of
advertiser i to the other advertisers) increases, the overbidding for
females increases. Figure 4(h) plots the utility ratio as the value of
the rate δ at which the advertiser i will leave the ad network changes.
Rather than plot δ directly, it plots the expected lifespan of the
advertiser computed from δ . It shows that for short lived advertisers,
K-parity has no effect since the advertiser is unlikely to reach K
wins for either gender. However, the constraint rapidly has an effect
as the advertiser lives long enough to win this number of slots.
Ad Exchange Revenue. Also important is how our strategy im-
pacts the revenue of the ad exchange. We explored the ratio of the
ad exchange’s revenue when there is one restricted advertiser for
each ad slot auction to the case where all advertisers are unrestricted
for all of our scenarios ( both real and synthetic dataset). In most
cases the ad exchange revenue will not decrease at all. The worst
case happens for (1.0, 1)-ratio constraint advertisers on Yahoo!/@
A1, the ratio of revenues is 0.993. The ad exchange can have a lower
bound on the K and r to make sure it does not lose any revenue.
Therefore, implementing this feature will not significantly reduce
the ad exchange’s revenue. Our observations show restricted adver-
tisers are more likely to overbid which increases the ad exchange
revenue. Figure 5 we compare the revenue of ad exchange’s for
different number of restricted advertisers (ρ) For Yahoo! A1 dataset.
As expected by increasing the number of restricted advertisers the
the revenue of ad exchange’s increases.
Performance. Algorithms 1 and 2, each of which only has to run
once for each parameter setting, completed in under 2 minutes and
under 10 minutes, respectively. Calculating bids during auctions,
each took the 2 microseconds. We used a 2013 MacBook Pro with a
2.3 GHz Intel Core i7 and 16 GB of 1600 MHz DDR3 memory.
8 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Adding parity constraints results in a surprisingly complex bidding
problem, exhibiting both over- and underbidding relative to the
advertiser’s immediate value of an ad slot. Despite this complexity,
we show a practical way of computing optimal bids, to within a
small approximation factor ϵ . This enables us to characterize how
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Figure 4: Experimental results for synthetic datasets
the cost of parity depends upon not just its level of strictness K or
R, but also the base rate p of types, their relative values to both the
governed advertiser i and to other advertisers, and the lifespan (or
discounting factor) δ , in sometimes counter-intuitive ways.
We envision two ways in which advertisers could use our bidding
strategy. Firstly, ad exchanges might implement it for them as a
feature in the ad buying interface. Such exchanges could use the data
it has to determine the demographics of individuals viewing ad slots
and adjust bids accordingly. While this would require a change to
the ad exchange, it would not require modifying the core auction
mechanism, making it a more straightforward feature to add.
Secondly, the strategy could be used either directly by the adver-
tiser or offered to them by demand-side platforms as a feature. This
approach has the advantage of not requiring any changes to the ad
exchange. It has the disadvantage of only working for ad exchanges
that support real-time bidding and programmatic advertising with
rich enough data to infer the group membership of the people view-
ing ad slots. Additionally, such rich data can pose privacy concerns.
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Figure 5: Ratio of the ad plot form revenue for Yahoo A1
dataset with (0.8,5)-ratio restricted advertiser for different
number of restricted advertisers.
We believe that either of these approaches to deployment would
be more straightforward than any way of deploying an auction mech-
anism that enforces parity constraints [4] or Guaranteed ad Delivery
(GD) [15, 18]. Only the ad exchange would be able to implement
such functionality. Presumably, ad exchanges have already selected
the auction mechanism that they believe would be best for their
business and would be reluctant to change it in a way that could
have wide ranging effects. Given that Google uses a generalization
of second-price auctions [9], it may believe that the theoretical result
that second-price auctions are uniquely optimal in certain settings
has some bearing on its setting. Thus, it may believe that any change
to its auction mechanism is likely to reduce its profits, a strong dis-
incentive. We believe that ad exchanges would be more willing to
implement a change that instead only alters the bids of advertisers
who opt in since it would be equivalent to one that advertisers could
already implement unilaterally by altering their bids. Furthermore,
since our approach changes just opted-in advertisers’ bids, there is a
sense in which they pay for it.
Future work can explore more complex forms of nondiscrimina-
tion constraints, such as ones holding probabilistically or asymptoti-
cally. The use of bonuses for ad clicks and online tracking to assign
different expected values to individual ad slots could be considered.
Future work could accommodate constraints for non-binary sensitive
attributes, such as location (a proxy for race, which is apparently not
explicitly tracked by any ad exchange) or for multiple constraints
simultaneously. Although our MDPs can straightforwardly be ex-
tended to such cases using a cross-product-like construction, the
MDP size will be exponential in the number of constraints and their
values, motivating more significant future work.
The constraints we explore are very strict in that they must hold
at all times, as opposed to holding with high probability or asymptot-
ically, which might be acceptable in some settings. In related prob-
lems, parity may only be required at the end of certain checkpoints,
such as at the end of a hiring season. Exploring such relaxations can
be future work.
We used a simple model in which the expected value of each fe-
male slot is equal to the others, and the expected value of each male
slot is equal to the others. Advertisers can use online tracking, ma-
chine learning, and other techniques to compute more fine-grained
estimations of slot values. Furthermore, our model of ad exchanges
does not include that they are often paid more when the viewer
clicks on the ad. Thus, their expected value for selling an slot to an
advertiser depends upon not just the bid prices but also the fits of the
ads for the slot, which also can be estimated with online tracking
and machine learning. Such tracking and machine learning can be
another route to discrimination [6].
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